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SUITS AGAINST UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
John Kaplan* 
CONCEPTS, Benjamin Cardozo has said, "are useful, indeed indis-pensable, if kept within their place. We will press them quite 
a distance. . . . A time comes, however, when the concepts carry us too 
far, or farther than we are ready to go with them, and behold, some 
other concept, with capacity to serve our needs is waiting at the gate. 
'It is a peculiar virtue of our system of law that the process of inclusion 
and exclusion, so often employed in developing a rule, is not allowed 
to end with its enunciation, and that an expression in an opinion yields 
later to the impact of facts unforeseen.' "1 
If Justice Cardozo was here setting forth more than a description of 
how the "philosophical" or "logical" method2 ideally should reach its 
conclusions, he was guilty of overoptimism. That the law has not yet 
escaped the "tyranny of concepts" is nowhere more clear than in its 
treatment of the unincorporated association. On the one hand the un-
incorporated association can be conceived of as an entity, a legal unit 
as distinct from the members who make it up as a corporation is from 
its stockholders. On the other hand the association can be regarded 
as a mere aggregate, a group of individuals similar to a family or a 
crowd and having no independent legal existence. For years the entity 
and the aggregate concepts struggled for supremacy while many ques-
tions of policy depended upon the outcome. Judges too often neglected 
to weigh the practical consequences of a decision, and instead deduced 
the outcome from their resolution of the philosophic controversy.8 
Despite this, a long process of judicial evolution had determined 
for the most part where each concept applied and had given us a rel-
atively definite, though arbitrary and inconsistent treatment of the 
unincorporated association. In recent years, however, the class action 
concept, brought into prominence by rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure4 and applied mechanically, without analysis or com-
,. Member, District of Columbia and New York Bars.-Ed. 
1 CARDOzo, Tim PARAI>oXI!s OF Lee.AL SCIENCE 62, 63 (1928), quoting Brandeis, J., 
dissenting in Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 at 619, 46 S.Ct. 592 (1926). 
2 CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 43 (1921). 
8 Hanley v. American Ry. Express Co., 244 Mass. 248, 138 N.E. 323 (1923). The 
court there held that an automobile registered in the name of a labor union became an 
"outlaw on the highways" when there was a change in the membership of the union on 
the theory that the ownership of the car had changed thus voiding its registration. 
4 Cn.uiJi:s, SoM:B PROBLEMS OF EQtJITY 199 (1950). 
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parison with prior decisions, appears to be remaking completely the 
federal procedural law respecting the unincorporated association. After 
surveying the law existing prior to the current use of the class action. 
this article will attempt briefly to point out the changes wrought by 
the application of that concept. 
BEFORE THE FEDERAL RuLES OF CIVII. PROCEDURE 
Suability in the Association Name 
Many commentators have advocated allowing the unincorporated 
• association to be sued in its common name as an entity despite the com-
mon law rule that the suit is merely one against all the members 
who must be joined. 5 Since the association can now own property, 
use a common name and seal, achieve an unlimited life and a limited 
liability, and act through a fixed management just like a corporate 
entity, the commentators argue that the association should be treated 
like a corporation in the courts. However, even though adherence 
to the aggregate theory effectively shields many large associations from 
suit,6 the great majority of state courts7 confronted with the problem 
have held that the common law aggregate concept must prevail unless 
changed by statute. The ground for most of these decisions was that 
an unincorporated association is not a "jural person"8 though this cliche 
appears only to restate its conclusion. Another justification, which 
appeals to more sophisticated writers,9 is that the privilege of suing and 
being sued in a common name is one granted by the sovereign only to 
corporations. Though this makes some sense as applied to suits by the 
association, it appears somewhat Pickwickian to speak of the "privilege" 
of being sued by a procedure which expedites the imposition of liability. 
5 Comment, 37 Ju.. L. REv. 70 at 79 (1942); Dodd, ''Dogma and Practice in the 
Law oE Associations," 42 HARv. L. REv. 977 (1929); Sturges, "Unincorporated Associa-
tions as Parties to Actions," 33 YALE L.J. 383 (1924); note, 30 N.C.L. RBv. 465 (1952). 
6 United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 at 389, 42 S.Ct. 570 
(1922): "To remand persons injured to a suit against each oE the 400,000 members [oE 
the United Mine Workers] to recover damages ••• would be to leave them remediless." 
7 St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 
N.W. 725 (1905); Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers Local Union No. 
131, 165 Ind. 421, 75 N.E. 877 (1905); District No. 21 United Mine Workers oE America 
v. Bourland, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546 (1925); Walker v. Grand Intl. Brotherhood oE 
Locomotive Engineers, 186 Ga. 811, 199 S.E. 146 (1938). 
s Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589, 78 N.E. 753 (1906): ''There is no such 
entity known to law as an unincorporated association and consequently it cannot be made 
a party defendant." 
9 Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions," 33 YALE L.J. 383 at 
398 (1924). 
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The Supreme Court seems to have adopted the minority rule, for 
in United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.10 it held that in an 
action to enforce liability under the Sherman Act, a union could be 
sued in its common name. Professor Edward Warren devoted an entire 
chapter in his treatise11 to an attempt to limit the Coronado case to 
a mere construction of the Sherman Act, arguing that the case did not 
hold on common law principles that the unincorporated association 
could always be sued as an entity in the federal courts.12 Professor 
E. Merrick Dodd,13 on the other hand, saw the decision as finally recog-
nizing that an unincorporated association acted as an entity and there-
fore should be treated as one in the federal courts regardless of the 
common law conception. Rule 17(b) Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure14 which provides that an unincorporated association may be sued 
in its common name for the enforcement of federal substantive rights, 
has been called a victory for Professor Warren's approach.15 Actually, 
it appears that while neither side completely impressed its views on 
the advisory committee, Professor Dodd' s viewpoint is the one preferred 
in the rule. Although the rule purports to restate the Coronado result, 
the inclusion of all federal rights goes much farther than that decision 
as Professor Warren was willing to read it. And one possible reason 
for rejecting Professor Dodd' s view that the association should also be 
suable as an entity in diversity actions regardless of state law was that 
such a rule might be regarded as too great an interference with the 
right of a state to establish unincorporated associations.16 
Even where federal rights alone are concerned, the adoption of the 
entity theory raises difficult though non-constitutional problems. Since 
before the federal rules the inconvenience of joining all the members 
of a large unincorporated association would render it virtually immune 
10 259 U.S. 344, 42 S.Ct. 570 (1922). 
11 WARREN, CoRPoRATE AnvANTAGBs WITHoaT INcoRPORATION 648-669 (1929). 
12 United States & Cuban Allied Works Engineering Corp. v. Lloyds, (D.C. N.Y. 
1923) 291 F. 889 at 892; Ex parte Edelstein, (2d Cir. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 636 at 638. 
13 Dodd, "Dogma and Practice in the Law of Associations," 42 HARV. L. RBv. 977 
(1929). 
14 ". • • capacity to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in 
which the district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other unincorporated 
association, which has no such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its 
common name for the purpose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States •••• " 
15 Witner, "Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation," 
51 YALE L.J. 40 at 42 (1941): "The controversy within the Harvard faculty between 
Professor Warren ••• and Professor Dodd ••• has for the most part been won by the 
narrow-construction proponent." 
16Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938), decided after the 
rules had been drafted but before they become effective, would have cast some doubt on 
the validity of such a rule. 
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from suit, rule 17(b) may violate the enabling act's prohibition against 
altering the substantive rights of any litigant.17 Furthermore, serious 
conceptual difficulties arise in fitting the rule into a federal system 
where federal law builds upon the foundations of legal relationships 
created by the states. For instance, in a state following the aggregate 
theory, the law does not recognize the existence of the association as 
such; what we would call the association is merely a group of individ-
uals with certain rights and duties among themselves. By state law its 
contracts are those of all its members as individuals and its torts are joint 
torts. But when a federal right is called into question, the association 
as such springs into existence and the federal law will then grant a judg-
ment against the entity which by state law is incapable of owning prop-
erty. The execution against the "association's" assets will then be satis-
fied from property owned by trustees for the members.18 
It must be admitted, however, that these anomalies are not peculiar 
to the federal system. Very much the same process must occur where 
a state, though following the aggregate theory, holds that failure to 
object to the non-joinder of all the members waives the defect and per-
mits suit against the association as an entity.19 
Jurisdiction Over the Association 
Even the question of jurisdiction over the person of the association 
is usually held to turn on whether the entity or the aggregate theory 
is adopted. Under the aggregate theory, jurisdiction over the associa-
tion merely means personal jurisdiction over all its members at one 
time. The entity theory, strictly speaking, does not require the presence 
of any member within the jurisdiction to provide a basis for service of 
process upon the association since all that is required is the doing of 
business within the jurisdiction.20 In cases where the entity concept 
always applies, such as federal question cases, section 4(d)(3) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service must be made 
on an officer, a managing or general agent, or any other agent author-
ized to receive service of process for the association. 
17 "The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to presence, by 
general rules, for the district courts of the United States ••• the practice and procedure in 
civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive 
rights of any litigant." 48 Stat. L. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C. (1940) §723b (now in 
§2072). 
lSCf. WARREN, CoBPoRATE AI>vANTAGEs Wrraoa-r lNcoRPORATioN 256, 587, 667 
(1929). 
19 United Mine Workers v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605, 167 S.W. 891 (1914); Barnes v. 
Chicago Typographical Union No. 16, 232 ID. 402, 83 N.E. 932 (1908). But see Pro-
prietors of the Mexican Mill v. Yellow Jacket Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. 40 (1868). 
20 Cf. Intl. Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154 (1945). 
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There is some authority that the person served must merely bear 
such a relation to the association that it is reasonable to expect that he 
will notify it of the action.21 It is generally held, however, that service 
on an official of a local union will not subject the parent body to the 
jurisdiction of the court.22 In one case this result was reached through 
a curious reverse twist on the Coronado case. 23 The court reasoned 
that since Coronado stood for the proposition that an international 
labor union is an entity, separate and distinct from both its members 
and its locals, service upon either members or locals can not bring the 
international body into court. If the court had analyzed the relation-
ship between the individual locals and the parent body instead of 
focusing its attention on whether the entity or aggregate concept should 
apply, it might have come to a different conclusion. Regardless of 
which concept applies, the association may act through the locals which 
compose it and these activities may often constitute the only business 
done in the state. Since this doing of business by the local may con-
stitute the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction over the association it 
seems unreasonable to hold that service upon the local will not bring 
the association into court. While this rule will not work too great a 
hardship on one suing the association where he can serve the agent 
of the international who enters the state to inspect the local's records, 
it is highly artificial to require such service when the international may 
be held liable for a tort committed long before the agent had arrived. 
Nevertheless, most courts hold that process must be served on the 
association itself. 
Venue in Non-Diversity Cases 
At least in actions based on federal rights, where rule 17(b) allows 
jurisdiction in personam to be based on the entity concept, that con-
cept also appears to control as to venue. Numerous lower federal 
courts have rejected arguments attempting to fix the inhabitancy of 
the association for venue purposes as the inhabitancy of any of its 
members or as the inhabitancy of all of its members.24 For example, 
in the leading case of Sperry Products, Inc. v. Association of American 
21 Operative Plasterers' and Cement Finishers' Intl. Assn. v. Case, (D.C. Cir. 1937) 
93 F. (2d) 56 at 65 (secretacy-treasurer of union local). 
22 Singleton v. Order of Railway Conductors of America, (D.C. ill. 1935) 9 F. Supp. 
417; Christian v. Intl. Assn. of Machinists, (D.C. Ky. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 481, both cited 
in advisory committee's notes to rule 4(c)(3), 2 MoolU!, FEDERAL PRAcnC:B, 2d ed., 
§ 4.01, p. 906 (1948). 
23 Dean v. Intl. Longshoremen's Assn., (D.C. La. 1936) 17 F. Supp. 748. 
2t Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 522; McNutt v. 
Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers, (D.C. Ark. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 871. 
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Railroads,25 the Second Circuit unanimously reversed a district court's 
ruling in a patent infringement suit that inhabitancy of the association 
meant the residence of all its members. The applicable venue statute26 
required the action to be brought in the district of which the defendant 
is an inhabitant or in any district where it has committed acts of in-
fringement and has a regular and established place of business. Judge 
Learned Hand held that the Coronado case and rule 17(b) laid down 
the proposition that for the purposes of this type of suit the unincorpo-
rated association is to be regarded as a jural entity distinct from its 
members. He then concluded, on the analogy to a corporation, that 
the association was found wherever any substantial part of its activities 
were carried on. On the other hand, he reasoned that to equate this 
to a :finding of inhabitancy would violate,-the spirit of the venue statute 
which distinguished between inhabitancy and having a regular and 
established place of business. Therefore, since the inhabitancy of 
the association involves something more than merely a regular place 
of business, it should be held to mean the principal place of business. 
Numerous decisions subsequent to Sperry have extended its holding 
to other venue statutes27 so that now it is pretty much black letter law 
that the inhabitancy of an unincorporated association is its principal 
place of business. 
Diversity Jurisdiction 
In a diversity case the requirements of rule 17(b) prevent a federal 
court from allowing suit in the association name unless the state law 
so provides. Even where the state law adopts the entity concept for 
all purposes, however, the federal courts cannot adopt it to determine 
whether diversity does in fact exist. 28 It is well settled that the citizen-
ship of an unincorporated association for diversity purposes is the citizen-
ship of all its members.29 Thus diversity suits against unincorporated 
associations are subject to the great limitations of the rule of Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss,80 requiring complete diversity between all plaintiffs 
2is (2d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 408. 
26 36 Stat. L. 1100 (1911), 28 U.S.C. (1940) §109 (now in §1400). 
27 Griffin v. illinois Cent. R.R., (D.C. ill. 1949) 88 F. Supp. 552 (Civil Rights Act); 
McNutt v. United Gas, Coke, and Chemical Workers, (D.C. Ark. 1952) 108 F. Supp. 
871 (general venue). 
28 Cf. Fred Macey Co. v. Macey, (6th Cir. 1905) 1S5 F. 725; Empire Rice Mill Co. 
v. K. & E. Neumond, (D.C. La. 1912) 199 F. 800. But see Van Sant v. American 
Express Co., (3d Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 355, criticized in 34 IowA L. REv. 356 (1949). 
29 Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 404 at 405 (1855); Levering & 
Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, (2d Cir. 1932) 61 F. (2d) ll5. 
so 3 Cranch (7 U.S.) 267 (1806). 
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and all defendants. In other words, an individual can not sue in the 
diversity jurisdiction any association having members who are citizens 
of his own state, and as a result diversity can never be the basis of 
federal jurisdiction over a nationwide association such as an inter-
national labor union which often will have members from every state. 
It is interesting to note that only a little more than one hundred 
years ago judges were debating whether to allow a corporation the 
benefit of the diversity jurisdiction. In Bank of the United States 11. 
Deveaux,81 John Marshall said, " ... that mere legal entity, a corpo-
ration aggregate, is certainly not a citizen" and held that the citizenship 
of a corporation for diversity purposes was the citizenship of all its 
stockholders. Some thirty-five years later, however, in Louisville Cin-
cinnati & Charleston R. Co. 11. Letson,82 the Court changed its mind 
and said, "A corporation . . . seems to us to be a person, though an 
artificial one, inhabiting and belonging to that state [of incorporation], 
and therefore entitled, for the purpose of suing and being sued, to be 
deemed a citizen of that state." Subsequently, the Court reached the 
same result through the use of a different :fiction, holding that the 
stockholders of a corporation are irrebuttably presumed to be citizens 
of the state of incorporation.88 
Some time ago it appeared as if the Supreme Court was beginning 
to repeat this ratiocination and allow an unincorporated association to 
be treated as an entity in determining whether diversity existed. In 
Puerto Rico 11. Russell84 the Court held that a sociedad en comandita 
"is so complete in contemplation of the law of Pureto Rico that we see 
no adequate reason for holding that the sociedad has a different status 
for purposes of federal jurisdiction than a corporation organized under 
that law." Despite the implication here that if the unincorporated 
association were an entity by state law it might be regarded as one for 
diversity purposes, subsequent decisions have not extended the holding 
and have limited it closely to its particular facts. 35 
Venue in Diversity Actions 
Unfortunately there has been no adequate discussion of the venue 
problems of the unincorporated association in diversity actions. If the 
federal courts adopt the aggregate theory for this purpose the venue 
statutes require that the action be brought in the plaintiff's district or, 
81 5 Cranch (9 U.S.) 61 at 86 (1809). 
822 How. (43 U.S.) 497 at 555 (1844). 
83 Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio R. Co., 16 How. (57 U.S.) 314 (1853). 
84 288 U.S. 476 at 482, 53 S.Ct. 447 (1933). 
85Gaunt v. Lloyds America of San Antonio, (D.C. Tex. 1935) 11 F. Supp. 787. 
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in the case of an association whose entire membership• is drawn from 
one state, either in the plaintiff's district or in the district where any 
member resides.36 Where the state follows the aggregate concept the 
federal courts would most probably do the same, thus restricting even 
further the diversity jurisdiction over unincorporated associations. 
Where the state follows the entity concept the problem becomes more 
complex.37 The analogy to rule 17(b) which adopts the entity con-
cept then in determining capacity to sue and be sued might lead the 
court to extend the holding of the Sperry case to diversity actions and 
treat the association as having one residence. On the other hand the 
fact that the aggregate concept must be applied in determining whether 
diversity does exist might lead a court to apply that concept to venue 
also. There are two cases directly on this point; one adopts the first 
view38 citing the Sperry case without adverting to the problems created 
by the fact that unlike Sperry it is a diversity action, while the other 
reaches the second result39 stressing the fact that although the associa-
tion can be sued in its name, it is not a true entity by state law. 
THE CLASS ACTION 
With this discussion of "classical" law as background we now 
turn to examine the effects of the recent use of the class action.40 
Originally the class action or representative suit was a device of equity 
to prevent a failure of justice in a suit involving a large class of indi-
viduals who had very similar claims or defenses. If the class was so 
large that it would be impracticable to serve and bring all its members 
before the court, equity allowed some who had interests typical of 
all the members and who could be expected to litigate the common 
claims or defenses adequately to sue or defend with the result con-
clusive upon all. It should be noted that this device is useful in two 
S6'fhis is the effect of 28 U.S.C. (1952) §1391, which provides that an action based 
only on diversity is restricted to the "Judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants 
reside," and 28 U.S.C. (1952) § 1392, which provides that where there are multiple 
defendants,. the action must be brought in the district of residence of any one provided all 
reside in the same state. See Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 39 S.Ct. 478 (1919). 
37 A corporation seeking to do business in a state may be required to waive any objec-
tion to improper venue in suits arising out of bus~ess done within the state. Neirbo Co. 
v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 60 S.Ct. 153 (1939). The Supreme 
Court has also held that an unincorporated association is entitled to no better treatment 
under the privileges and immunities clause. See Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 at 550, 
48 S.Ct. 577 (1928). It therefore appears that a state could similarly extract a waiver of 
venue from an unincorporated association. 
as Darby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 522. 
39 Koons v. Kaiser, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 5ll at 516. 
40 For a general discussion of the history of the class action see CHAPEE, SoME 
PnoBLEMs OP EQUITY 199 et seq. (1950). 
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distinct situations. First, the class action can (if there is fair representa-
tion) avoid the social waste of many trials deciding the same questions, 
where each of the class members could be sued separately but only at 
great expense;n Second, where the requirements of joinder prevent 
each member from being sued alone, the class action will provide a 
means of suing the group. Where the group consists of the members 
of an unincorporated association under the aggregate theory it is not 
merely a question of saving great effort for with any reasonably large 
association the choice is between making the suit possible or impossible. 
Furthermore, there is no real problem of fairness of representation in 
this case for the officers of the association will always intervene to 
defend the suit 4 :?- The class action, then, is no more than a back door 
through which to proceed when compulsory joinder bars the front way. 
It is interesting to note that although the great majority of cases 
allowing the class action allow it against the unincorporated association, 
most writers have treated the device merely as a method of making 
litigation against a group less expensive.43 
Nevertheless in both of these situations the same concepts are 
universally held to apply. In all procedural matters both are merely 
suits against a number of individuals, although there must be an 
allegation that they are also sued in their representative capacity. The 
result of this suit against relatively few individuals will bind the entire 
membership of the class and where the class consists of the members 
of an unincorporated association, the association itself will be bound 
just as if all its members had been joined under the aggregate theory 
or as if it had been sued in its name where the entity theory applied.44 
41 See Sheffield Waterworks Co. v. Yeomans, L.R. 2 Ch. App. 8 (1866). See note, 
67 HAB.v. L. RBv. 1059 (1955), for a penetrating discussion of the factors necessary before 
a class action should be held to bind those not before the court. 
42 For example in Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 
(4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 403 at 406, the court in holding that the representation was 
adequate pointed out, "This service, as a matter of fact, did bring the brotherhood in, 
fighting." 
43 Note, 46 CoL. L. RBv. 818 (1946); comment, 63 YALE L.J. 493 at 509 (1954). 
44 It should be noted that there may be an important substantive difference in the 
recovery, depending on whether the association is successfully sued as an entity or as an 
aggregate. In the former case the recovery will run against the association's funds only, 
while if all the members are joined, they can be made individually liable for whatever can-
not be recovered from the association's treasury. One reason for this denial of individual 
liability where the association is sued as an entity is that it is extremely unfair and possibly 
violative of due process to grant a judgment against a member when in fact he may have 
had no notice of the action and possibly not even been within the jurisdiction of the 
court In addition it may be felt that if the plaintiff has the advantage of being able to 
bring suit without joining all the members he should pay for this by being held to the 
entity concept when recovery is to be had. 
Despite the fact that the class action treats the association as an aggregate, the reasons 
for denying individual liability are just as valid in the classs action situation as where the 
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. . Although the class action dates back over two hundred years, its 
recent importance in the federal courts begins with the adoption of 
rule 23(a), which made it applicable to legal as well as equitable 
causes of action.45 This incorporation into the federal rules attracted 
attention to what had previously been a rather obscure equity rule, 
and as lawyers began to realize the immense changes the use of the 
class action was making in the law respecting unincorporated associa-
tions, the device became more and more popular. 
U sE OF THE CLASS AcTION RuLE IN Surrs AGAINST 
llNINcORPORATED AssocIATIONS 
Federal rule 23(a) provides, "If persons constituting a class are so 
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, 
such of them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate represen-
tation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character 
of the right sought to be enf~rced for or against the class is (1) joint, or 
d 
,, 
common, or secon ary . . . . 
Although there is a great deal of confusion46 over exactly what 
rights are joint, common, or secondary it is almost universally agreed 
that a right is one of these if, but for the class action device, all members 
of the plaintiff class exerting the right would have to be joined.47 
And while the rule does not mention liabilities as well as rights, it is 
generally assumed that this is a mere error of draftmanship48 and that, 
where the members of the class would otherwise have to be joined as 
defendants, rule 23(a) applies. It would therefore appear that rule 
23(a) provides a method of bringing suit against an unincorporated 
association. 
Nevertheless, before turning to a consideration of the uses to which 
the class action has been put, we must examine certain general argu-
ments which have been advanced against its availability in suing un-
incorporated associations. The first is that the fundamental incon-
association is sued as an entity. Most courts have agreed and denied individual liability 
in the class action situation. See Witmer, "Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the 
Unincorporated Corporation," 51 YALB L.J. 40 (1941). 
45 See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, (8th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 182. 
46 See Keeffe, Levy, & Donovan, "Lee Defeats Ben Hur," 33 CoRN. L.Q. 327 at 335, 
n. 22 (1948). 
47 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PnAcnCE, 2d ed., 3435 (1948): "The 'true class suit' is one 
wherein, but for the class action device the joinder of all interested persons would be 
essential. • • • A good illustration of an action involving a joint right is a suit by or against 
representatives of an unincorporated association." 
48 Cf. Lesar, "Class Suits and the Federal Rules,'' 22 Mnm. L. REv. 34 at 55 (1937); 
46 CoL. L. REv. 818 at 827 (1946). 
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sistency between the entity and the aggregate theories prevents the 
class action which treats the association as an aggregate of individual 
members from being used in a jurisdiction which adopts the entity 
theory.49 From this it would follow that the class action could not 
be used where rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires the entity theory, i.e., in actions to enforce federal rights or 
in diversity suits brought in states which allow suits against associations 
as entities. This argument appears unpersuasive, however, for the 
entity and aggregate theories are not mutually exclusive although they 
represent different ways of looking at the association. Even states 
which provide for suits against the entity will also allow suit if all the 
members are joined.50 A similar though less conceptual argument 
is that in providing one way of suing the association, rule l 7(b) implies 
that there should be no other way. This contention was presented 
in Tunstall 11. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen51 
but was rejected on the ground that "the manifest purpose of the pro-
vision of rule 17(b) relating to suits against partnerships and unincor-
porated associations is to add to, not to detract from, the existing 
facilities for obtaining jurisdiction over them. The language of rule 
17 (b) relating to suits against partnerships and unincorporated associa-
tions is permissive. So also is the language of rule 23(a). Together 
they provide alternative methods of bringing unincorporated associa-
tions into court." It should be added that the notes of the advisory 
committee make it quite clear that the class action of rule 23(a) was 
intended to provide a means of suing unincorporated associations.52 
A third argument, closely related to the other two, was accepted 
in the Sperry case, where Judge Learned Hand wrote, "The rule 
[23(a)] itself limits such [class] actions to situations in which the 
parties 'are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all 
before the court.' Here it is entirely practicable to do so by suing 
the Association as such."53 While this argument might not be 
objectionable as an original proposition, it is foreclosed by a long line 
of decisions allowing class actions under similar statutes even though 
the association might have been sued as an entity.54 Furthermore it 
49 Cf. Lloyd v. I.oaring, 6 Ves. Jr. 773, 31 Eng. Rep. 1302 (1802). 
ISO The statutes providing for 51,lit against the association as an entity are invariably 
permissive. See W.ARREN, CoRPORATB AnvANTAGEs WrmoUT lNcoRPoRAnoN 547 (1929). 
51 (4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 403 at 405. 
52 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcncE, 2d ed., §23.01, p. 3405 (1948). 
53 (2d Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 408 at 412. 
MWARREN, CoRPORATB AnvANTAGES WrraoUT lNcoRPORATION (1929), lists on 
p. 543 the states allowing suit against an unincorporated association by a class action, and 
on p. 547 lists those which allow suit against the association in its name. Colorado, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana and Wyoming appear on both lists. 
956 M1cmcAN LA.w REvmw [ Vol. 53 
is difficult to conceive how all the individual members may be con-
sidered to be brought before the court by a suit against the entity. 
In any event • it is well established that the class action will not 
be barred by the mere existence of an alternative method of enforcing 
the same claim/ii> It remains, however, to consider exactly how the 
class action changes the results reached under the simple applications 
of the entity or aggregate theories. 
Jurisdiction Over the Association 
. The leading case considering the jurisdiction of the court over 
an unincorporated association in an action brought under rule 23(a) 
is Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen.56 
In that case a group of Negro :firemen brought suit against the Brother-
hood alleging discriminatory practices in violation of the Railway Labor 
Act. The principal place of business of the Brotherhood was in the 
Northern District of Ohio, and hence if sued as an entity the Sperry 
case would require it to be sued there. On the other hand, the rail-
road, an indispensable party, could not be served in that district since 
it was doing no business there. Therefore the firemen served the 
railroad at a place of business in the Eastern District of Virginia and, 
using rule 23(a), also served two subordinate lodges of the brother-
hood and the president of one of them for themselves and as represen-
tatives of the union. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Parker first decided that 
the class action was available here for a suit against the unincorporated 
~sociation. Then, after examining the allegations made by the plain-
tiff and concluding that the action was indeed a class action, he dealt 
with the question of whether the service on the representatives was 
sufficient to bring the association within the jurisdiction of the court. 
First of all he held that the requirements of service prescribed by rule 
4(d)(3), where the union is to be sued as an entity, did not apply 
to the class action. Further, he intimated that some lesser degree of 
service on the union should be required· to bring it into court under 
rule 23(a). Here the two locals were agencies of the Brotherhood and 
the officer of one of them was also a fair representative of the asso-
ciation. Thus since the court had jurisdiction over both officer and 
locals, Judge Parker concluded that the class action could proceed. 
ri5Tisa v. Potofsky, (D.C. N.Y. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 175 at 180, holds that §301(b) 
of the Labor Management Relations Act does not displace the class action. But cf. Schatte 
v. Intl. Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 84 F. Supp. 569. 
116 (4th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 403. 
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Note carefully the full implication of the Tunstall decision with 
respect to acquiring jurisdiction over the association. The aggregate 
theory which requires no association activity but merely the presence 
of all members is combined with the class action concept which 
requires only the presence of one or more "representatives," thus 
making the association far more vulnerable to suit than any corpora-
tion. A state can not acquire jurisdiction over a corporation merely 
by serving the vacationing president, but the class action gives it juris-
diction over the association whose "representative" is caught. 
The Tunstall decision was somewhat qualified by the case of 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Graham,57 
where in a similar action by Negro firemen the District of Columbia 
Circuit refused to allow the class action on the grounds that the 
representatives of the union were not truly representative. The court 
based its reasoning on the theory that since the action was for a declar-
atory judgment and an injunction against discrimination, the locals 
and officers served who had no part in the discrimination could not 
be truly representative of those who were actually practicing the 
discrimination. The court did not mention the fact that the plaintiffs 
also sought damages with respect to which the defendants presumably 
would be representative since they could litigate the case to defend their 
share in the association's funds. Moreover, any distinction between 
suits for declaratory judgments or, injunctions and suits for damages 
can be attacked on both the practical and conceptual levels. First of 
all, if jurisdiction over the representatives is allowed they will not 
merely be litigating the case as individuals since the association itself 
will come in to protect its interests. Secondly, every right of the 
association is its property owned jointly by all its members and there-
fore a member would appear to have an interest sufficient to satisfy 
the requirements for being a representative even if he is not a direct 
beneficiary of the right. Indeed, most courts have been satisfied, 
without any further showing, that the officers of local lodges of a union 
will adequately represent the national association58 even though in a 
non class action they could not receive process for it. 
Venue 
The concept that the class action is still only a suit against individual 
representatives and not against the association would indicate that 
57 (D.C. Cir. 1948) 175 F. (2d) 802, revd. on other grounds 338 U.S. 232, 70 S.Ct. 
14 (1949). 
5s See Biller v. Egan, 290 ill. App. 219 at 229, 8 N.E. (2d) 205 (1937). 
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only venue with respect to the representatives would be considered. 
At least where federal rights are at issue the courts have assumed that 
such is the case without weighing the advantages and disadvantages 
of this result,59 thus for all practical purposes overruling the principal 
place of business rule of the Sperry case. In the Tunstall case, for 
example, there apparently was no real contest over venue once the 
question of jurisdiction had been decided. Similarly, in the Graham 
case the court decided that the venue was wrongly chosen because 
the defendants were not truly representative assuming that had they 
actually been representative the venue would have been correct. It 
is easy to see that this line of reasoning disregards completely the 
rationale underlying the requirements of venue and goes from the 
one extreme of making it too difficult to sue an unincorporated asso-
ciation to the other of making it too easy. For once a member or 
officer of the association can be found residing in a district, that district 
can be made the basis for venue even though it bears no relationship 
to the business of the association. 60 
The Class Action Rule in Diversity Suits 
The concept of the class action as merely a suit against individuals 
who happen to be representatives is also extended into the question of 
diversity jurisdiction and it is there that the situation becomes most 
confused. It has been pointed out that even though a state adopts the 
entity theory, the citizenship of all the association's members must be 
considered in order to determine whether diversity exists. In the 
class action, however, it is well settled61 that only the citizenship of 
the representatives need be considered, since the suit is technically 
only against them and not against the association. Furthermore the 
representatives may be selected with an eye to achieving diversity,62 
thus in effect bringing the large unincorporated association back into 
the diversity jurisdiction. 63 
59 See Salvant v. Louisville & Nashville R., (D.C. Ky. 1949) 83 F. Supp. 391. 
60Jt is possible that the association may move under 28 U.S.C. (1952) §14O4(a) for 
a transfer to a more convenient forum. It might have some difficulty since §14O4(a) on 
its face applies only to parties and witnesses. If the association succeeded in having the 
forum changed it would be held to have waived all objections to the new venue. See 
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Rodney, (3d Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 111. 
61 Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. (57 U.S.) 288 (1854). 
62 But see McGovney, "A Supreme Court Fiction," 56 HARv. L. RRv. 1090 at 1112 
(1943): ''The ingenuity of lawyers in class suits in selecting the members of the class to 
be put forward as the parties of record should be condemned as a fraud on the courts, 
not sanctified." 
6S One case flatly holds that rule 82, providing that the federal rules are not to 
expand or contract the jurisdiction of the federal courts, prevents the use of rule 23(a) 
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This is not to imply that no valid reasons exist for extending the 
diversity jurisdiction to include suits by and against unincorporated 
associations. It would seem that the basic policies underlying the 
establishment of the diversity jurisdiction would favor including the 
large association. 64 For example, if a larger labor union has just begun 
to acquire membership in an area where labor has previously not been 
organized, there may be considerable hostility toward the union, and 
the federal courts should provide a forum where these local prejudices 
will be at a minimum. 65 In other areas of the nation those suing the 
union might have a legitimate claim to the diversity jurisdiction, since 
they are deprived of the efficient machinery of the federal courts and 
may be forced to encounter local pro-labor prejudice. 
On the other hand, the strong arguments for restricting the diversity 
jurisdiction66 might make such an extension unwise. It has been argued 
that the improvement in state judicial systems and the diminution of 
local prejudices have lessened the need for the diversity jurisdiction 
and that the heavy load of cases67 in the federal courts only because of 
diversity of citizenship renders the courts less able to perform their 
primary task of protecting federal rights. 68 
In view of the powerful arguments on each side it would seem 
that the problem should be resolved only after thoughtful judicial or 
legislative study. In fact there has been no legislation on the subject 
and no court has actually analyzed the reasons for or against including 
the unincorporated association within the diversity jurisdiction. 
to bring the unincorporated association within the diversity jurisdiction. Shelvey v. Barto, 
(D.C. N.Y. 1952) 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 23a-61, Case I, p. 317. Contra: Philadelphia 
Local 192 v. American Fed. of Teachers, (D.C. Pa. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 345; Malamey v. 
Upholsterers' Intl. Union, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 7 F.R.D. 403; White v. Quisenberry, (D.C. 
Mo. 1953) 14 F.R.D. 348. 
64 Parker, "The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It," 18 A.B.A.J. 433 
at 437 (1932); Howland, "Shall Federal Jurisdiction of Controversies Between Citizens 
of Different States be Preserved?" 18 A.B.A.J. 499 at 501 (1932). In the case of the labor 
union, there are other reasons why Congress might want to grant jurisdiction to the federal 
courts. See Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 
348 U.S. 437 at 444, 75 S.Ct. 488 (1955). 
65 WENDELL, Rm.ATIONS BBTWl!llN THE FllDBRAL AND STATE CotillTS 267 (1949). 
But see FRANKPtillTBR AND GRBBNB, THE LlllOR INJUNCTION 5-17 (1930) for the propo-
sition that while there were sectional differences in anti-labor feeling the federal courts in 
an area reflected the prejudice as much as the state courts. 
'66 See S. Rep. 530, 72d Cong., 1st sess. (1932); S. Rep. 691, 71st Cong., 2d sess. 
(1930). See also Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48 at 53, 75 S.Ct. 151 
(1954) (concerning opinion of Justice Frankfurter). 
67 But see Yntema and Jaffin, ''Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction," 79 
UNIV. PA. L. RBv. 869 at 915 (1931). 
68 Wechsler, ''Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code," 13 LAw 
AND CoNT.BM. PRoB. 216 at 234-240 (1948). 
960 MicmcAN LAw RBvmw [ Vol. 53 
Nevertheless the status quo has been changed silently and without 
discussion so that now by the use of the class action the unin~orporated 
association can almost always be sued in a diversity action. A touch of 
irony was added to this by the serious split within the Supreme Court 
in Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation. 68a There three justices not only found a "serious 
constitutional problem" (p. 442) in any attempted grant of jurisdiction 
to the federal courts to apply state law in suits upon collective bargain-
ing contracts but also adverted to the great burdens inherent in any 
such transfer of litigation from the state to the federal courts (p. 437). 
Yet in all probability the diversity necessary to support a class action 
could have been found in Westinghouse had the pleadings been framed 
in terms of a class action diversity suit instead of a suit under section 
30 I of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Allowing the unincorporated association to be sued on diversity 
grounds raises special problems where the state adopts the aggregate 
theory. In such· a state it may be so difficult to join the membership 
of a large association that for all practical purposes it can not be sued 
in the state courts. This obstacle is not due merely to a common law 
technicality, for in some states it is based on a policy judgment that 
associations of workers should not be sued. 69 Or at least if the rule is 
not based overtly on this policy the active opposition. of labor unions 
has prevented the common law rule from being changed by legislation. 
Nevertheless, the federal courts under rule 23(a) will entertain the 
action and give judgment against the association. 70 It would seem 
that if the common law rule is merely procedural there is a great deal 
of substance "secreted in the interstices of procedure."71 If this is so 
does this application of rule 23(a) run afoul of the Erie v. Tompkins12 
doctrine requiring conformity between state and federal decisions? 
asa 348 U.S. 437, 75 S.Ct. 488 (1955). 
69 Comment, 37 !LI.. L. REv. 70 at 71 (1942). 
70 Most courts and commentators have ignored this· problem in entertaining class 
actions against unincorporated associations. See Montgomery Ward v. Langer, (8th Cir. 
1948) 168 F. (2d) 182. One commentator in 46 CoL. L. REv. 818 at 836, n. 76 (1946), 
suggesting a revision of rule 23(a) writes, "It is conceded that Erie R.R. v. Tompkins ••• 
l>ears on the problem -of broadening the scope of representative actions in the manner 
suggested. However, the impact of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins on federal procedure is beyond 
the scope of this Note. The problem has been ably discussed elsewhere." None of the 
able discussions cited, however, concern rule 23(a). 
71But see United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 at 390, 42 
S.Ct. 570 (1922): "Though such a conclusion as to the suability of trade unions is of 
primary importance • • • , it is after all in essence and principle merely a procedural 
matter." 
12 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938). 
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Supreme Court decisions extending the Erie case seem to hold that 
where a state denies relief for any reason relief will similarly be with-
held in the federal courts. Thus a state's general statute of limitations, if 
applicable to a given cause of action in a state court, will be applied in 
the federal forum.73 Similarly, if the state courts are closed to a corpo-
ration which fails to qualify to do business within the state, federal 
courts sitting in that state must also close their doors to the corpo-
ration. 74 The inability to litigate these cases in the state courts is 
based on factors unrelated to the underlying rights and duties of the 
parties just as in the class action situation. Nevertheless, these results 
have been reached through a rigorous application of the "outcome" 
test propounded in Guarantee Trust Co. 11. York, requiring that the 
outcome of a litigation in the federal courts be "substantially the 
same"711 as that which would have been achieved in the state courts. 
An exception to this rule may exist here because of the express provision 
for class actions in the federal rules. Although the Supreme Court 
has not attempted to delimit the scope of the York test, it seems un-
likely that the complete obliteration of distinctions between state and 
federal courts, which is the logical extreme of that test, will be allowed. 
A stopping point may properly be where federal policy has been 
formulated to an extent sufficient to warrant inclusion in the federal 
rules.76 This would clearly not be inconsistent with the Erie case 
itself, since underlying obligations created by the state would be 
enforced according to state law. No federal rule has ever been declared 
invalid by the Court because of inconsistency with the Erie doctrine,77 
the only direct challenge resulting in a judgment upholding the rule.78 
Since the problem with respect to the class action exists neither at the 
clearly procedural nor at the clearly substantive level but "in the twilight 
zone where rational classification could be made either way,"79 it is 
difficult to predict the result should this application of the class action 
to unincorporated associations be questioned. 
73 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945). 
74 Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 69 S.Ct. 1235 (1949). 
711326 U.S. 99 at 109, 65 S.Ct. 1464 (1945). 
76 Note, 66 HAnv. L. R:Ev. 1516 at 1519 (1953); Gavit, "States' Rights and Federal 
Procedure," 25 Ind. L.J. l (1949). 
'17Jn Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 69 S.Ct. 1233 
(1949), the Court held that rule. 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which pro-
vides, "a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court," does not stop 
the running of a state statute of limitations. 
1s Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 61 S.Ct. 422 (1941). 
'19 Sampson v. Channell, (1st Cir. 1940) llO F. (2d) 754 at 756. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen how, by use of the class action device, the procedural 
law concerning suits against the unincorporated association has been 
completely remade. It is not the purpose of this article to point out 
which of the changes should have and which should not have been 
made. Indeed it is possible that on close examination all the changes 
will prove to have been improvements in the law. It should, how-
ever, be pointed out that each of the changes for better or worse has 
been made without any consideration of the basic policies involved 
and has proceeded solely from a logical and mechanical application 
of the class action concepts. It would appear that the time has come 
for some court to escape this "tyranny of concepts" and reintroduce 
policy considerations into the law of unincorporated associations. 
